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This study examines the major determinants of transfer pricing aggressiveness. Based on a hand-
collected sample of 183 publicly-listed Australian firms for the 2009 year, our regression results 
show that firm size, profitability, leverage, intangible assets, and multinationality are 
significantly positively associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness after controlling for 
industry-sector effects. Our additional regression results also indicate that firms augment their 
transfer pricing aggressiveness through the joint effects of intangible assets and multinationality.  
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to examine the major determinants of transfer pricing 1 
aggressiveness as a means by which firms can significantly reduce their corporate tax liabilities. 
Multinational firms can structure and price payments and intra-firm trade in such a way as to 
facilitate tax avoidance, principally by strategically setting artificial inter-company transfer 
prices (Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Grubert, 2003; Clausing, 2006; Usmen, 2012). The aim of 
Australia’s transfer pricing rules is to ensure that related party international transactions are 
conducted on an arm’s length basis so that profits are not artificially deflated (inflated) in high-
tax jurisdictions (low-tax jurisdictions) (Hamilton et al., 2001). Aggressive transfer pricing 
activity is reflected by extensive non-arm’s length transactions between related parties.  
We are motivated in this study to evaluate the major determinants of transfer pricing 
aggressiveness because audit activity by tax authorities and economic analysis by treasury 
departments have collectively found that mispricing of related party transactions is a major factor 
contributing to a progressive erosion of corporate tax revenue. 2  Transfer pricing risks are 
                                                 
1 Transfer pricing is a system of laws and practices utilized by countries to ensure that goods and services are 
transferred amongst related parties at market-based prices so that profits are correctly attributable to different 
jurisdictions (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2010). 
2 This is evident by a decline in effective tax rates (ETRs) and the increase in the number of firms reporting a zero or 
nominal corporate tax liability. 




considered high-priority in Australia by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) which recently 
requested information from 150 large (i.e. greater than AUD100 million turnover) corporate 
groups on: restructuring, financing relating to guarantee fees and intra-group loans, services 
provided and received, and related party transactions (ATO, 2010). These risk reviews stem from 
transfer pricing audits carried out by the ATO in 2001–2006 which resulted in amended tax 
assessments of AUD1.33 billion, with an additional AUD1.25 billion in disallowed tax losses 
(ATO, 2010). The nature and outcome of review and audit activity by the ATO over the past 
decade is indicative of the large tax risks related to transfer pricing. Transfer pricing also appears 
to be a major issue globally. For instance, a recent Ernst and Young (2011) survey found that tax 
risks associated with transfer pricing constitute one of the most critical and challenging issues 
facing firms internationally.3 Transfer pricing is economically important to multinational firms 
with flow-on effects on earnings, dividends, return on capital and share prices (Sikka and 
Willmott, 2010).4 In the Australian context, transfer pricing is economically important because 
Australia is an active global trader of goods and services (The Treasury, 2011).5 
Based on a hand-collected sample of 183 publicly-listed Australian firms for the 2009 year, 
our regression results demonstrate that firm size, profitability, leverage, intangible assets, and 
multinationality are significantly positively associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness after 
controlling for industry-sector effects. Our additional regression results also show that firms 
enhance their transfer pricing aggressiveness via the joint effects of intangible assets and 
multinationality.  
                                                 
3 As indicated by Ernst and Young (2011), the anticipated review of intercompany financing (service) transactions 
by tax authorities increased significantly from 7 percent (55 percent) in 2007 to 42 percent (66 percent) in 2010. 
4 Eden et al. (2005) examined the impact of the U.S. transfer pricing penalty on the stock market valuation of 
Japanese multinational firms with U.S. subsidiaries. They found that the penalty resulted in a decline in their 
cumulative market value of USD56.1 billion, representing 12.6 percent of their 1997 market value.  
5 For example, intra-firm trade in 2009 accounted for around 50 percent of total Australian cross border trade in 
goods in services and 22 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (The Treasury, 2011).  




This study contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, it extends the 
literature on transfer pricing practices of multinational firms by providing empirical evidence of 
the key determinants of transfer pricing aggressiveness. Second, a measure of transfer pricing 
aggressiveness is constructed based on attributes regularly emphasized in the ATO’s audit 
programs and issues scrutinized by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC). Construction of a transfer pricing aggressiveness index provides a methodological 
contribution that extends beyond Australian corporate transfer pricing research because this 
index permits replication in other jurisdictions (e.g. Canada, New Zealand, the U.K. and the 
U.S.). Third, this study investigates the interaction effect between intangible assets, 
multinationality and tax havens to determine whether these variables are used concurrently to 
augment transfer pricing aggressiveness. To the best of our knowledge, these issues have not 
been addressed empirically in the literature. Finally, this study provides valuable information 
about the major determinants of transfer pricing aggressiveness to policymakers and regulators 
who should find our results useful in terms of developing policy and regulation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the theory and 
develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design, and Section 4 reports the empirical 
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theory and hypotheses development 
Several variables are argued to represent key determinants of transfer pricing 
aggressiveness. These are: firm size, profitability, firm leverage, intangible assets, 
multinationality, and tax haven utilization. The rationale and literature support for each of these 
variables is now discussed. 




 2.1. Firm size 
Larger firms typically engage in more business activities and financial transactions than 
smaller firms, thereby providing additional opportunities to significantly avoid corporate taxes 
(Rego, 2003). Larger firms (as opposed to smaller firms) tend to have: substantial intercompany 
transactions that may have transfer pricing and/or thin capitalization implications, tax-
advantaged leasing and financing arrangements, and complex flowthrough entities (including 
partnerships and trusts). Larger firms therefore are able to take advantage of tax arbitrage 
opportunities that may exist across different tax jurisdictions. Furthermore, Mills et al. (1998) 
and Slemrod (2001) suggested that larger firms have lower average costs of tax planning than 
smaller firms. Hence, larger firms can achieve economies of scale through tax planning, and 
have the resources and incentives to reduce the amount of corporate taxes payable (Rego, 2003).  
Research by Hanlon et al. (2007) found that larger firms normally have greater tax 
deficiencies relative to their actual tax liability. Moreover, Bernard et al. (2006) observed that 
larger firms engage in greater manipulation of transfer prices. Finally, research by Benvignati 
(1985), Al-Eryani et al. (1990), and Conover and Nichols (2000) also found that larger firms are 
more likely to participate in aggressive transfer pricing arrangements. To formally test the impact 
of firm size on transfer pricing aggressiveness, we develop the following hypothesis: 
H1. Firm size is positively associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness. 
 
2.2. Profitability 
More profitable firms are likely to engage in transactions or schemes designed to 
significantly avoid corporate taxes (Rego, 2003). Furthermore, research by Wilkie (1988) and 
Wilkie and Limberg (1993) found a positive association between pre-tax income and effective 




tax rates (ETRs). Rego (2003) also found that firms with greater pre-tax income avoid 
proportionately more corporate taxes than firms with less pre-tax income. In terms of transfer 
pricing, more profitable firms may adjust transfer prices to reduce (increase) profits in high-tax 
(low-tax) jurisdictions. For instance, highly-profitable firms such as Apple, Google and 
Microsoft have been able to preferentially locate profits in low-tax jurisdictions and increase tax 
deductible expenditure (e.g. royalty payments) in high-tax jurisdictions to reduce taxable profits 
accordingly (Mutti and Grubert, 2009; Womack and Drucker, 2011; Duhigg and Kocieniewski, 
2012). To formally test the impact of firm profitability on transfer pricing aggressiveness, we 
develop the following hypothesis: 
H2. Firm profitability is positively associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness. 
 
2.3. Firm leverage 
Highly-leveraged firms are likely to take advantage of the main characteristics of debt 
capital (i.e. the fungibility of borrowed funds) to significantly avoid corporate taxes (Hines, 
1996; Richardson et al., 1998; Newberry and Dhaliwal, 2001; Rego, 2003, Dyreng et al., 2008). 
Previous research by Bernard et al. (2006) showed that firms with high debt-to-equity ratios tend 
to be more tax aggressive than firms with low debt-to-equity ratios. In fact, tax considerations 
appear to make debt the preferential form of financing in high-tax jurisdictions and equity in 
low-tax jurisdictions (Hines, 1996; Rego, 2003; Dyreng et al., 2008). Multinational firms 
normally finance group members with transfers of debt and/or equity capital (Richardson et al., 
1998). Transfers of debt and/or equity capital are motivated in part by tax arbitrage opportunities 
and thus, firms that engage in selective localization of debt for tax purposes are more likely to be 
aggressive in terms of their transfer pricing arrangements (Richardson et al., 1998). It is possible 




that leverage may act as a substitute to transfer pricing aggressiveness in terms of achieving 
reduced group tax liabilities. To formally test the impact of firm leverage on transfer pricing 
aggressiveness, we develop the following hypothesis: 
H3. Firm leverage is positively associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness. 
 
2.4. Intangible assets 
Another key issue regarding transfer pricing aggressiveness is the transfer of intangible 
assets (e.g. intellectual property and R&D expenditure) to group entities (Grubert, 2003; Grubert 
and Mutti, 2007; Gravelle, 2010). Since intangible assets are difficult to value, the transfer of 
payments (i.e. the royalties attributed to intangibles) are also difficult to value at arm’s length 
prices (Gravelle, 2010). The U.S. Department of the Treasury (2007) asserts that there is a 
significant risk of transfer pricing aggressiveness through the transfer of high value intangible 
assets (e.g. intellectual property) that are crucial to the core business operations of a firm and are 
difficult to value. In fact, Grubert (2003) found that the risk of transfer pricing aggressiveness is 
increased by the variability in the interpretation of transfer pricing valuations, and the difficulty 
for firms to define precisely the transaction under which intangible property transfers take place.  
The average level (i.e. current and previous reporting period) of intangibles is considered to 
be a proxy of a firm’s ability to shift income internationally (Hanlon et al., 2007; Dyreng et al., 
2008). Undeniably, intangibles have certain characteristics such as the lack of well-established 
markets and subjective valuations that can be exploited simultaneously by a firm in several 
jurisdictions. Hence, there is greater opportunity to engage in transfer pricing aggressiveness 
through the transfer of intangible assets between variably-taxed jurisdictions (Shackelford et al., 
2007; Dyreng et al., 2008). Finally, tax benefits derived from R&D expenditure may vary 




depending on the host country of that expenditure. In Australia for example, the R&D tax 
concessions allow firms to claim a tax deduction in their income tax return of up to 125 percent 
(and in some cases up to 175 percent) of their eligible expenditure on R&D activities. To 
formally test the impact of intangible assets on transfer pricing aggressiveness, we develop the 
following hypothesis: 
H4. Intangible assets are positively associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness. 
 
2.5. Multinationality 
Given that multinational firms regularly apply efficient tax planning across group entities, it 
is plausible that firms with subsidiaries that derive foreign source income will have the incentive 
and opportunities to engage in tax avoidance (Rego, 2003; Hanlon et al., 2007). For instance, 
multinational firms have the opportunity to reduce corporate taxes by locating operations in low-
tax jurisdictions, by shifting income from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions, and by 
exploiting variations in the tax rules of different countries (Slemrod, 2001). In fact, Slemrod 
(2001) claims that multinational firms employ a set of inter-related, globally orientated tax 
planning methods and tools to efficiently reduce group tax liabilities.  
Rego (2003) found that multinational firms tend to be more successful at avoiding corporate 
taxes than purely domestic firms as the former are able to achieve economies of scale in tax 
planning through the use of their extensive operations and inter-firm trade. Mills and Newberry 
(2004) observed that multinational firms with relatively low average foreign tax rates reported 
lower taxable income in U.S. subsidiaries than firms with relatively high average foreign tax 
rates. Hanlon et al. (2007) found that foreign controlled firms have more than double the levels 
of tax aggressiveness relative to domestic controlled firms. Similarly, Dyreng et al. (2008) 




observed that firms with greater international exposure have more opportunities to engage in tax 
avoidance strategies. Benvignati (1985) found that firms with a larger number of foreign 
subsidiaries showed a strong positive association with their market-based transfer pricing 
strategy. Finally, Jacob (1996) observed that multinational firms had greater opportunities to 
engage in manipulation of transfer prices owing to differences in tax rates and profitability 
between U.S. and foreign group entities. To formally test the impact of multinationality on 
transfer pricing aggressiveness, we develop the following hypothesis: 
H5. Multinationality is positively associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness. 
 
2.6. Tax haven utilization 
Transfer pricing aggressiveness may be facilitated if members of the corporate group are 
residents of countries with tax haven status that offer beneficial financial, legal and taxation 
regimes (ATO, 2004; OECD, 2006; Dharmapala, 2008). Tax havens may impose no, or only 
nominal amounts of corporate tax, have laws or administrative practices which prevent the 
effective exchange of information between tax authorities, and lack transparency on financial 
and tax arrangements (e.g. regulatory, legal and administrative provisions), and access to 
financial records (OECD, 2006). Tax havens also promote tax avoidance via transfer pricing by 
permitting the reallocation of taxable income to low-tax jurisdictions, and by reducing the 
amount of domestic taxes paid on foreign income (Desai et al., 2006). Specifically, tax avoidance 
can be achieved through transfer pricing manipulation by transferring goods to countries with 
low income tax rates (e.g. tax havens) at the lowest possible transfer price and by transferring 
goods out of these countries at the highest possible transfer price. Tax havens may thus facilitate 
transfer pricing aggressiveness by acting as a conduit for the flow of goods and services between 




countries with established operations and parent firms domiciled in higher taxed countries 
(Department of the Treasury, 2007; The Treasury, 2011).  
Firms may also exploit the secrecy laws and lack of transparency of tax havens to conceal 
assets and income that may be subject to tax in Australia (OECD, 2006). Harris et al. (1993) 
found that U.S. tax liabilities were lower for U.S. multinational firms with a legal presence in a 
tax haven. They inferred this to be indirect evidence of aggressive transfer pricing by firms with 
tax haven incorporated subsidiaries. Moreover, firms incorporated in a jurisdiction with tax 
haven status may play an important role for the entire corporate group (Slemrod and Wilson, 
2009; Wilson, 2009). For example, tax haven incorporated firms may control the treasury, 
insurance, business and service functions for the corporate group, or facilitate the tax efficient 
transfer of funds between group entities. Thus, efficient tax planning across group entities 
involving tax haven incorporated firms could have a major impact on the accountability and 
transparency of the entire corporate group (Desai et al., 2007). It is possible that utilization of tax 
havens may act as a substitute to transfer pricing aggressiveness in terms of achieving reduced 
group tax liabilities. To formally test the impact of tax haven utilization on transfer pricing 
aggressiveness, we develop the following hypothesis: 
H6. Tax haven utilization is positively associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Sample selection and data source 




Our sample initially consisted of the top 300 publicly-listed Australian firms for the 2009 
year.6 However, the sample was then reduced to 183 firms after excluding firms which fall into 
the following categories: financial firms (41); insurance firms (11); U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principle (GAAP) reporting firms (16); property partnership or trust entities (11); 
firms that did not report in the 2009 year because they were newly incorporated or were taken-
over or merged with other firms (20); and firms with no overseas subsidiaries (18). Financial 
institutions and insurance firms were excluded from the sample due to significant differences in 
the application of accounting policies and derivation of accounting estimates, along with the 
different regulatory constraints faced by these firms. Finally, all financial data were hand-
collected from the annual reports of the sample firms. 
 
3.2. Base regression model 
Our base ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is estimated as follows: 
TPRICEit = α0it + β1SIZEit + β2PROFITit + β3LEVit + β4INTANGit + β5MULTIit  
+ β6THAVit + β7-15INDSECit + εit                                                                    (1)                                                                       
where: i = firms 1–183; t = the 2009 financial year; TPRICE = the transfer pricing 
aggressiveness index ranging 0–100 percent; SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; 
PROFIT = the natural logarithm of pre-tax income; LEV = long-term debt divided by total assets; 
INTANG = the natural logarithm of R&D expenditure; MULTI = the number of foreign 
subsidiaries divided by the total number of subsidiaries; THAV = a dummy variable of 1 if the 
                                                 
6 The 2009 financial year was chosen as this year coincided with the final stages of the global financial crisis (GFC). 
Adams (2009) claims that transfer pricing issues were more important for multinational firms during the GFC owing 
to the decline in forecast tax revenues by treasury departments, and the increased number of transfer pricing audits 
by tax authorities during this period. For instance, during the GFC in Australia, audit activity by the ATO found that 
multinational firms were aggressively transferring existing or unrealized tax losses from foreign operations with 
lower ETRs back to Australia with higher ETRs (ATO, 2008b). It is possible that firms facing financial distress 
could be particularly motivated to use transfer pricing to increase cash flows and liquidity. 




firm has at least one subsidiary company incorporated in an OECD (2006) listed tax haven, 
otherwise 0; INDSEC = industry sector dummy variable of 1 if the firm is represented in the 
particular Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) category, otherwise 0; and ε = the 
error term. 
 
3.3. Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is represented by transfer pricing aggressiveness (TPRICE). We 
develop a TPRICE index which comprises eight dichotomous items (see below). The ‘sum-score’ 
approach has been used successfully in other research, especially in relation to the construction 
of corporate governance indexes (e.g. Cremers and Nair, 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; 
Brown and Caylor, 2006; Bebchuk et al., 2009), and the development of accounting disclosure 
indexes (e.g. Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Choi, 1973; Buzby, 1974; Barrett, 1975; Wallace, 1988; 
Cooke and Wallace, 1989; Cooke, 1991; Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Bavishi, 1995; Salter and 
Niswander, 1995; Marston and Shrives, 1991; Zarzeski, 1996; Lanis and Richardson, 2012). The 
dichotomous items representing TPRICE collectively measure the occurrence of several 
transactions that are either non-commercial in nature or the firm has not been able to substantiate 
the commerciality of those transactions. Therefore, TPRICE measures the degree of transfer 
pricing aggressiveness.  
Consistent with the use and application of corporate governance and disclosure related 
indexes in previous research, the higher (lower) the overall score for TPRICE, the higher (lower) 
is the level of transfer pricing aggressiveness. Items that comprise the TPRICE index were 
selected based on the general criterion that they must involve intra-entity transactions that are not 
commercially justified or not of a commercial or arm’s length nature in line with ATO (2005) 




and ASIC (2010) guidelines and regulations dealing with aggressive transfer pricing activity.7 
This general criterion ensures that our TPRICE index is ‘all-inclusive’ of the major types of 
transfer pricing aggressiveness that are disclosed by firms in the annual report. Thus, we find 
eight items in the annual report that satisfy our general criterion as follows:8 
(1) The existence of interest free loans between related entities;  
(2) The existence of debt forgiveness between related entities; 
(3) The existence of impaired loans between related entities; 
(4) The provision of non-monetary consideration (e.g. services or non-liquid assets) without 
commercial justification between related entities; 
(5) The absence of formal documentation held by the firm to support the selection and 
application of the most appropriate arm’s length methodologies or the absence of formal 
documentation relating to transfer pricing between related entities; 
(6) The disposal of capital assets to related entities without commercial justification; 
(7) The absence of arm’s length justification for transactions between related entities; and  
(8) The transfer of losses between related entities without commercial justification.  
                                                 
7 Intra-entity transactions which are deemed to lack commercial justification include those, for example, where there 
was a transfer of assets, loans advanced to or repaid by related parties, or provision of services between related 
parties often in different tax jurisdictions where there was at least one of the following elements: (a) no disclosed 
rationale for undertaking material transactions and the value of the assets or value of the services provided were 
material or significant (based on total revenue or total assets of the firm), so there is an expectation that the 
underlying commercial reasoning for the transfer be provided; (b) there was no statement in the report describing 
that the terms of the transaction were based on arms-length pricing; (c) the amounts were substantially larger than 
similar transactions (if any) undertaken in preceding or later years with no particular related event to explain the 
reason for the transaction and the amount of the transaction; (d) there was no indication that expert advice was 
obtained in relation to material transactions; (e) if the terms of the financial benefit are unusual or extraordinary, or 
excessively generous, then it is less likely that the terms can be considered ‘reasonable’ and so would not be arm’s 
length terms; and (f) there is a negative effect on the firm’s financial position or performance that is not balanced by 
sufficient positive effects such that the terms would not be reasonable in the circumstances if the parties were 
dealing at arm’s length. This data were collected from ATO (2005) and ASIC sources (2010) in conjunction with 
accounting standard AASB 124 (AASB, 2008), targeting transfer pricing arrangements that do not comply with the 
Corporation Act 2001 (Cwlth) requirements or are considered as ‘high risk’ elements by the ATO (2005).  
8 These eight items were extracted from the financial statement notes in the annual report. Specifically, the sections 
dealing with borrowings, receivables, payables, and related party transactions.  




A description and examples of coding of 1 against each of the items that comprise TPRICE 
is provided in Appendix A. Evidence for the existence (or otherwise) of each item was obtained 
from both narrative and accounting data in the notes to the financial statements, 9  and the 
corporate governance section of the annual report.  
The ATO and ASIC have targeted tax avoidance schemes or schemes that are non-compliant 
with the Corporation Act 2001 (Cwlth) which involve each of the eight aforementioned items. 
These eight items are considered by the ATO (2005) and ASIC (2010) as high risk as they result 
in the transfer of benefits to related entities without commercial justification.10 Australian firms 
that engage in international dealings with related entities are also required to complete a 
Schedule 25A Form under Australian tax legislation and lodge it along with their annual tax 
return. The Schedule 25A Form imposes strict obligations on firms to disclose information about 
their related entity international dealings, such as the commercial basis for setting prices for 
goods and services, and loans provided and received.  
Each of the eight transfer pricing aggressiveness items represented in the sample was scored 
as either ‘1’ where the firm engaged in activities indicative of transfer pricing aggressiveness and 
were unable to substantiate the arm’s length or commercial basis of transactions, or ‘0’ where 
there was no evidence of activities suggestive of transfer pricing aggressiveness. To ensure 
objective and reliable scoring of the eight transfer pricing aggressiveness items, a checklist and a 
set of decision rules were developed initially by the primary author (see Appendix B). The 
                                                 
9 In particular sections dealing with financial income and expenses: trade and other receivables, investments in 
controlled entities and associated entities, trade and other payables, interest bearing liabilities, related party 
transactions, asset disposals, and tax losses were used to obtain evidence for each of the TPRICE items. 
10 Furthermore, as part of its tax compliance program, the ATO (2010) examines the transfer of loans between group 
members that are then forgiven without any commercial justification with the net result of a tax benefit being 
achieved. Similarly, ASIC (2010) has formulated additional guidance for firms in disclosing and justifying the 
nature of their related entity transactions. ASIC (2010) requires disclosure of transactions involving debt forgiveness 
between related entities, the determination of arm’s-length pricing, terms and conditions and application of 
exceptions if applicable, and lack of expert advice about related entity loans.  




scoring was then performed by one of the other authors and a research assistant within a three-
month period of when the primary author collected the data. The scoring was subsequently cross-
checked by the primary author to determine the error rate in each individual’s scoring. The 
primary author randomly selected a sub-sample of 40 firms (around 20 percent of the sample 
firms) to achieve this task. Several errors were detected by the primary author during the cross-
checking, but the total number of errors was found to be insignificant and they were adjusted 
accordingly. Overall, the results of the cross-checking are indicative of the reliability of 
measurement of the TPRICE index. Finally, our measure of a sample firm’s transfer pricing 
aggressiveness activity is computed as the sum of the individual number of the transfer pricing 
aggressiveness items that it discloses in its annual report (each scored as ‘1’) divided by the 
number of items applicable to that firm.11 This computation resulted in a TPRICE index ranging 
between 0–100 percent for each sample firm. In the majority of firms (96 percent), all eight items 
were applicable. However, a minority (4 percent) of firms did not disclose the existence of 
intragroup loans and hence ITEM1 (the existence of interest free loans), ITEM2 (the existence of 
debt forgiveness) and ITEM3 (the existence of intragroup loan impairment) of TPRICE were not 
considered applicable. TPRICE was then computed using five applicable items.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the eight transfer pricing aggressiveness items 
that comprise the TPRICE index. The most important items relate to ITEM1, ITEM5 and ITEM7. 
Specifically, ITEM1 (mean of 0.469) shows that around 46.9 percent of the sample firms disclose 
the existence of interest free loans between related entities. ITEM5 (mean of 0.901) indicates that 
                                                 
11 Each item is treated equally in the scoring of our TPRICE index. In fact, previous research indicates that weighted 
and un-weighted scores generally provide similar results (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Beattie et al., 2004). 
Moreover, the focus of our study is not on one particular user group as such, so weighting of transfer pricing items 
was not undertaken. Cooke (1989) for example, claims that one class of user will attach different weights to an item 
than another class of user. Finally, the development of weighted indices also involves subjective judgment (Marston 
and Shrives, 1991; Beattie et al., 2004).  




about 90.1 percent of the sample firms disclose either the absence of formal documentation held 
by the firm to support the selection and application of the most appropriate arm’s length 
methodologies or the absence of formal documentation relating to transfer pricing between 
related entities. ITEM7 (mean of 0.300) illustrates that around 30 percent of the sample firms 
disclose the absence of arm’s length justification for transactions between related entities. Less 
important items include ITEM2, ITEM3 and ITEM4. In particular, ITEM2 (mean of 0.103) shows 
that around 10.3 percent of the sample firms disclose the existence of debt forgiveness between 
related entities. ITEM3 (mean of 0.142) indicates that about 14.2 percent of the sample firms 
disclose the existence of impaired loans between related entities. ITEM4 (mean of 0.103) 
illustrates that around 10.3 percent of the sample firms disclose the provision of non-monetary 
consideration (e.g. services or non-liquid assets) without commercial justification between 
related entities. Finally, far less important items include ITEM6 and ITEM8. Specifically, ITEM6 
(mean of 0.032) shows that around 3.2 percent of the sample firms disclose the disposal of 
capital assets to related entities without commercial justification. ITEM8 (mean of 0.060) 
indicates that around 6 percent of the sample firms disclose the transfer of losses between related 
entities without commercial justification. 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
3.4. Independent variables 
Our independent variables are denoted by firm size (SIZE), firm profitability (PROFIT), firm 
leverage (LEV), intangible assets (INTANG), multinationality (MULTI), and tax haven utilization 
(THAV). 
SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets in keeping with previous research 
by Stickney and McGee (1982), Porcano (1986), and Richardson and Lanis (2007). PROFIT is 




measured as the natural logarithm of pre-tax income in line with Rego (2003). LEV is measured 
as long-term debt divided by total assets in accordance with previous research by Stickney and 
McGee (1982) and Gupta and Newberry (1997). INTANG is measured as the natural logarithm of 
R&D expenditure as recommended in earlier research by Dyreng et al. (2008). 12 MULTI is 
measured as the total number of foreign subsidiaries divided by the total number of subsidiaries 
in keeping with previous research by Rego (2003) and Mills and Newberry (2004). Finally, 
THAV is measured as a dummy variable of 1 if the firm has at least one subsidiary company 
incorporated in an OECD (2006) listed tax haven,13 otherwise 0 (Desai et al., 2006; Dharmapala 
and Hines, 2009; Richardson et al., 2013).14 
 
3.5. Control variables 
We include industry-sector (INDSEC) as a control variable in our base regression model. 
INDSEC dummy variables, defined by the two-digit GICS codes, are included as control 
variables in our base regression model because it is possible for transfer pricing aggressiveness 
                                                 
12 Dyreng et al. (2008) found that R&D expenditure is a suitable proxy measure for the potential tax benefits which 
can result from the use of intangible assets by a firm. R&D expenditure is tax deductible and expenditure on R&D 
projects can significantly reduce the amount of corporate taxes payable by a firm (Dyreng et al., 2008). R&D 
expenditure is our proxy measure of intangible assets and, due to the unusual nature of these assets and their non-
physical form, it makes it easy for firms to transfer these assets or to manipulate prices and the commercial nature of 
transactions relating to the use of intangible assets. In fact, R&D expenditure may be transferred to a specific tax 
jurisdiction to maximize tax benefits. Levels of investment in technology or pharmaceuticals for example could be 
achieved in the most favorable tax jurisdictions, and funding for such projects could also be achieved via the transfer 
of loans amongst related parties. Falk (2005) examined the factors affecting R&D in a sample of OECD countries. 
He found two basic instruments driving R&D expenditure: (1) the provision of a tax treatment which is favorable to 
firms that invest in R&D; and (2) the ability of firms to obtain financing so that they could invest in R&D projects. 
13 The OECD (2006) catalogues 33 tax havens: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, 
Belize, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, Isle 
of Man, Jersey, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, New 
Caledonia, Panama, Samoa, San Marino, Seychelles, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Turks and Caicos Islands and Vanuatu. 
14 Other methods of measuring THAV were also included in our base regression model, such as the proportion of tax 
haven incorporated subsidiaries. However, results were not significant. In the case of the small-to-medium sized 
firms (i.e. firms with less than AUD600 million total assets at year end), transfer pricing may be assisted greatly 
through the use of only one tax haven. Our sample comprises around 34 percent of firms which could be regarded as 
small-to-medium in size. 




to fluctuate across different industry sectors (Stewart, 1977; Oyelere and Emmanuel, 1998; 
Bernard et al. 2006). Stewart (1977) found that transfer pricing aggressiveness is more common 
for firms operating in the materials and pharmaceuticals industry sectors. Bernard et al. (2006) 
also found that transfer pricing aggressiveness is used by firms operating in the materials sector. 
We thus include ten INDSEC dummy variables in our study: capital goods, consumer service 
retail, energy, food, stables and beverage, materials, media, pharmaceuticals and health care, real 
estate, transport, and utilities.15 No sign predictions are made for the industry-sector dummies.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (TPRICE) and independent 
variables (SIZE, PROFIT, LEV, INTANG, MULTI and THAV) for the 2009 year. In particular, the 
dependent variable TPRICE shows that the sample firms have a transfer pricing aggressiveness 
score of around 26.2 percent. TPRICE has a range from 0 percent to as high as 75 percent (i.e. 
six out of the eight transfer pricing aggressiveness items are exhibited).  
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
We also present descriptive statistics of the transfer pricing aggressiveness index according 
to two-digit industry classification (GICS) codes in Table 3. Although there are a greater number 
of firms represented in industries such as materials (52), energy (38) and consumer service retail 
(29) in our sample, firms are relatively evenly distributed across all industries, indicating no 
significant industry bias. 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
                                                 
15 With materials being the omitted sector in our base regression model. 




4.2. Correlation results 
The correlation results are reported in Table 4. Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficients (Spearman rank correlation coefficients) are reported below (above) the diagonal. 
The results show significant correlations (with predicted signs) between TPRICE and SIZE, 
PROFIT, LEV, INTANG, MULTI and THAV (p < 0.10 or better). Table 4 also reports that only 
moderate levels of collinearity exist between our explanatory variables. Finally, we calculate 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) when estimating our base regression model to test for signs of 
multi-collinearity between the explanatory variables. No VIFs exceed five, so multi-collinearity 
is not problematic in our study (see Hair et al., 2006). 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
4.3.  Regression results 
Table 5 reports our base regression model results.16 The regression coefficient for SIZE is 
positive and significantly associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness (p < 0.01), so H1 is 
supported by the results: larger firms engage in greater manipulation of transfer prices. The 
regression coefficient for PROFIT is positive and significantly associated with transfer pricing 
aggressiveness (p < 0.05), which supports H2: more profitable firms have the capacity and 
incentive to engage in transfer pricing aggressiveness. The regression coefficient for LEV is 
positive and significantly associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness (p < 0.05), so H3 is 
supported by the results: firms with higher debt-to-equity ratios are more aggressive in terms of 
transfer pricing. The regression coefficient for INTANG is positive and significantly associated 
with transfer pricing aggressiveness (p < 0.05), which supports H4: intangible assets are utilized 
                                                 
16 We note that coefficient estimates are standardized, and standard errors are corrected for all of the regression 
models reported in this paper based on the White (1980) procedure. 




to aggressively transfer profits internationally.17 The regression coefficient for MULTI is positive 
and significantly associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness (p < 0.05), so H5 is supported 
by the results: the greater the proportion of foreign controlled subsidiaries, the greater the level 
of transfer pricing aggressiveness. However, the regression coefficient for THAV is not 
significant, so H6 is not supported. For the control variables, the regression coefficients for firms 
belonging to the capital goods, consumer service retail, energy, food, staples and beverage, 
media, and pharmaceuticals and healthcare industry sectors are positive and significantly 
associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness (p < 0.05 or better). However, we observe that the 
regression coefficients for firms belonging to the real-estate, transport and utilities industry 
sectors are not significant. Our study thus provides evidence of transfer pricing aggressiveness 
across a broad range of industry sectors. 
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
4.4. Additional analysis: interaction effects 
Previous research by Jacob (1996), Conover and Nichols (2000), and the Department of The 
Treasury (2007) in the U.S. suggests that firms are able to augment their aggressive transfer 
pricing activities several ways, including the use of intangible assets, international operations and 
tax haven-incorporated subsidiaries. The Department of the Treasury (2007) emphasized that 
multinational firms are able to exploit differences in tax rates and tax rules to reduce their group 
tax liabilities and this can be achieved by shifting high-value intangible assets to the most 
favorable tax jurisdiction. Harris et al. (1993) also found that the tax liabilities of U.S. firms with 
tax haven subsidiaries is much lower than those U.S. firms without tax haven affiliates. They 
                                                 
17 We also constructed a dummy variable for INTANG of 1 if the firm incurred R&D expenditure in the 2009 
financial year, otherwise 0. Our (unreported) results show that the regression coefficient for INTANG based on the 
dummy variable measure is also significant (p < 0.05). 




infer these results to be indicative of aggressive transfer pricing of firms with tax haven 
subsidiaries.18 We extend previous research on transfer pricing economics and taxation (e.g. 
Jacob, 1996; Conover and Nichols, 2000; Department of the Treasury, 2007) by considering 
empirically whether the interaction effects of intangible assets, multinationality and tax haven 
utilization jointly impact transfer pricing aggressiveness. Specifically, we multiply MULTI and 
THAV by INTANG to construct interaction terms for use in our extended regression model. Our 
base regression model in Equation (1) is therefore extended to include the additional interaction 
terms.  
We report the results of this extended analysis in Table 6. The regression coefficient for 
MULTI*INTANG is positive and significantly associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness (p 
< 0.05). However, the regression coefficient for THAV*INTANG is not significant. These results 
provide some empirical support for previous research (e.g. Jacob, 1996; Conover and Nichols, 
2000; DoT, 2007) which suggests that firms are able to enhance transfer pricing aggressiveness 
by means of intragroup transfers of intangible assets amongst foreign controlled firms. In fact, 
ownership and responsibility for R&D may be centralized in foreign jurisdictions with relatively 
lower ETRs. The preferential location of intangible assets (e.g. R&D) in higher tax jurisdictions 
could possibly bring-about a reduction in the Australian corporate tax liabilities for these firms. 
This may be reflected in the increased flow of intangible assets between variably-taxed 
jurisdictions, leading to opportunities to engage in transfer pricing manipulation. The regression 
coefficients for many of our other independent variables (i.e. SIZE, PROFIT, LEV, INTANG and 
MULTI) are also positive and significantly associated with TPRICE (p < 0.05 or better). Finally, 
                                                 
18 The case of Microsoft Corporation provides an interesting example of these various interactions. Specifically, 
Microsoft licensed its software for use in Europe, the Middle East and Africa through an Irish subsidiary. Microsoft 
received royalty payments that were tax deductible in high-tax jurisdictions and subject to a low rate of tax in 
Ireland. This particular practice allowed Microsoft to save at least USD500 million in corporate taxes each year 
(Mutti and Grubert, 2009).  




for our control variables, the regression coefficients for INDSEC (i.e. CAPG, COSR, ENE, FSB, 
MEDI and PHAH) are positive and significantly associated with transfer pricing aggressiveness 
(p < 0.05 or better). 
[Insert Table 6 About Here] 
 
5. Conclusions  
This study examines the major determinants of transfer pricing aggressiveness of publicly-
listed Australian firms. Our regression results show that firm size, profitability, leverage, 
intangible assets and multinationality are significantly positively associated with transfer pricing 
aggressiveness after controlling for industry-sector effects. Moreover, our additional regression 
results indicate that firms augment transfer pricing aggressiveness through the joint effects of 
intangible assets and multinationality.  
Whilst enhanced disclosure by firms regarding the pricing and commercial basis of related-
party transactions would be helpful from a tax administration viewpoint, the ATO and ASIC are 
aware of the burden already faced by Australian firms in complying with the complex transfer 
pricing rules. The quality of documentation about transfer pricing arrangements varies greatly 
from one firm to another. However, the provision of specific documentation by management in 
regards to arm’s length pricing contributes to a more effective tax administration and greater 
transparency of the transfer pricing rules to analysts, shareholders and potential investors. This 
may also assist in reducing a firm’s tax compliance burden and the need to book income tax 
reserves and tax liabilities with respect to anticipated tax audits. 
This study is subject to several limitations. First, our sample is drawn from publicly-listed 
firms because data is not available for private firms. Second, our transfer pricing aggressiveness 




index measure is drawn from aggregated financial data at the firm-level, so transactional transfer 
pricing data may be obscured within a broader ‘noise’ of aggregated financial data that could 
hinder our ability to isolate specific elements of transfer pricing. It is possible that some firms 
may not have disclosed complete details of related party transactions due to materiality reasons, 
or because the nature of transactions may not comply with debt covenant arrangements or may 
impede a firm from undertaking further capital raisings. However, as we are dealing with 
publicly-listed Australian firms, materiality is unlikely to be a major issue in our study. 
Moreover, these firms are also likely to address disclosure requirements in accordance with 
AASB 124 Related Party Disclosures (AASB, 2008). 
Future research could consider the determinants of transfer pricing aggressiveness across 
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Appendix A. Examples of coding of the eight TPRICE index items  
 
(1) The existence of interest free loans between related entities:  
 
‘Loans provided to jointly controlled and associated entities relates mainly to loans provided to Reach of $191 
million (2008: $161 million) and the 3GIS Partnership (3GIS) of $38 million (2008: $33 million). The loan 
provided to Reach is an interest free loan and repayable on or after 31 December 2010 upon the giving of six 
month notice by both PCCW Limited and us. We have provided for the non-recoverability of the loan as we do 
not consider that Reach is in a position to be able to repay the loan amount in the medium term’ (Telstra 
Limited 2009 Annual Report, p. 223). 
 
(2) The existence of debt forgiveness between related entities: 
 
Parent     
       ‘30 June  30 June    
       2009   2008    
         $'000   $'000    
Loans to related parties       
Loans advanced to:       
Balance at beginning of the year   566,006   514,249    
Loans advanced      155,125   51,757    
Loans written down      (225,439)   
Intercompany debtors     1,363   –   
   
Loans advanced from:       
Balance at beginning of the year   288,268   227,754    
Loans advanced      –  60,514    
Loans forgiven on disposal of discontinued operation (199,373)  – ’  
(Straights Resources 2009 Annual Report p.141) 
 
‘Non-assessable debt forgiveness’ (Alesco Ltd 2009 Annual Report, p. 69).  
 
‘Loan forgiveness income received on inter-company loan forgiveness $100,000’ (Alesco Ltd 2009 Annual 
Report, p. 68). 
 
(3) The existence of impaired loans between related entities: 
 
‘Amounts owing by controlled entities: These loans are interest free and at call. During the year an assessment 
of the recoverable amount was made and an impairment of USD151,407,000 was recorded’ (Roc Oil Limited 
2009 Annual Report, p. 66). 
 
‘30 June  30 June    
        2009   2008    
          $'000   $'000 
Related party receivables      79,794   78,294 
Impairment allowance for non-recovery of intercompany loans  (58,645)  (58,645) 
21,149   19,649’ 
(Antares Energy Ltd 2009 Annual Report, p. 39). 
 
(4) The provision of non-monetary consideration (e.g. services or non-liquid assets) without commercial 
justification between related entities: 
 
‘Intercompany loans 
The Company provides working capital to its controlled entities. Transactions between the Company and other 
controlled entities in the wholly owned Group during the year ended 30 June 2009 consisted of: 




(i) Working capital advanced by Apex Minerals NL; 
(ii) Provision of management and other services by Apex Minerals NL; 
(iii) Expenses paid by Apex Minerals NL on behalf of its controlled entities; and 
(iv) Cash received by Apex Minerals NL on behalf of its subsidiaries with no bank accounts. 
 
The above transactions were made interest free with no fixed terms for the repayment of principal on the 
working capital advanced. At balance date amounts receivable from controlled entities totalled $216,347,982 
(2008: $114,831,721) and the amounts payable to controlled entities was $413,182 (2008 $413,394)’ (Apex 
Minerals NL 2009 Annual Report, p. 66). 
 
(5) The absence of formal documentation held by the firm to support the selection and application of the most 
appropriate arm’s length methodologies or the absence of formal documentation relating to transfer pricing 
between related entities: 
 
‘In addition to the bilateral Advanced Pricing Agreement the Group has in place with both the Australian Tax 
Office and the United States Internal Revenue Service, on 2 July 2009 a unilateral Advanced Pricing 
Agreement was entered into with the French Taxation Authority in France in relation to the royalty rate used 
by GSM (Europe) Pty Ltd for the right to use certain Group brands and trademarks. This agreement will cover 
the period 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2011 and provides certainty for the Group in respect of royalties being paid 
in accordance with French transfer pricing rules and regulations. Non-existence of a formal policy regarding 
related party or intra-company transfers of assets, services and funds’ (Billabong Ltd 2009 Annual Report, p. 
4). This statement resulted in a score of zero (0). The non-existence of a formal policy regarding related party 
or intra-company transfers of assets, services and funds would result in a score of one (1). 
 
(6) The disposal of capital assets to related entities without commercial justification: 
 
‘On 31 October 2009, Woodside Energy Ltd executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement to dispose of 
Woodside's 51.55% interest in the Otway project (disposal group), being Exploration Permits Vic/P43 and 
T/30P and Production Licences Vic/ L23, T/L2, T/L3 and T/34P, to Origin Energy Resources Ltd…….The 
consideration receivable is $712.5 million, which will be adjusted for transactions that occur between the 
effective date and the completion date’ (Woodside 2009 Annual Report, p. 97). In this example, there is no 
mention of an arm’s length or commercial basis for the sale. 
 
(7) The absence of arm’s length justification for transactions between related entities: 
 
‘It is the Consolidated Entity’s policy that all transactions with related parties are on normal terms and 
conditions, except for the loan of $1,387 million shown below. $1,204 million of this loan was made from the 
Company to Pacific Brands (Australia) Pty Ltd on 6 April 2004 to enable it to acquire Pacific Brands Holdings 
Pty Ltd and its associated international operations. An additional loan of $250 million was made by the 
Company to Pacific Brands (Australia) Pty Ltd after the capital raising conducted in June 2009. An impairment 
loss of $67 million was also recognized on the loan’ (Pacific Brands 2009 Annual Report, p. 82). 
 
(8) The transfer of losses between related entities without commercial justification:  
 
‘The entities have also entered into a tax funding agreement under which the wholly-owned entities fully 
compensate Billabong International Limited for any current tax payable assumed and are compensated by 
Billabong International Limited for any current tax receivable and deferred tax assets relating to unused tax 
losses or unused tax credits that are transferred to Billabong International Limited under the tax consolidation 
legislation. The funding amounts are determined by reference to the amounts recognised in the wholly-owned 
entities’ financial statements’ (Billabong International Limited 2009 Annual Report). 
  




Appendix B. Checklist and decision rules for scoring the eight TPRICE index items 
 
• Review the following sections of the annual report for details of each of the eight TPRICE index items: (1) 
financial income and expenses note, (2) trade and other receivables note, (3) investments in controlled entities 
and associated entities notes, (4) trade and other payables note, (5) interest bearing liabilities note, (6) related 
party transactions, (7) asset disposal, and (8) tax losses. 
• With regards to TPRICE item 1, in particular review notes relating to interest bearing liabilities and related 
party transactions. Loans provided from the parent to subsidiaries or vice-versa that are interest-free are scored 
as 1; otherwise 0. 
• With regards to TPRICE item 2, review notes relating to receivables, payables, loans and related party 
transactions. A loan provided to a group member without any requirement to pay back the loan or forgiveness 
of a intragroup loan without any commercial basis is scored as 1; otherwise 0. 
• With regards to TPRICE item 3, review notes relating to receivables and loans. The write-down or impairment 
of loans advanced to group members without commercial justification is scored as 1; otherwise 0. 
• With regards to TPRICE item 4, review the section on related party transactions, investments in controlled and 
associate entities. If there is no statement that the services provided or non-monetary assets provided to other 
group entities is on commercial or arm’s length terms, then the transaction is scored as 1; otherwise 0. In a 
majority of cases, firms will state that a series of assets transferred or services provided is on normal 
commercial terms which is scored as 0. If a firm states that the transfer of these items is on ‘normal terms’ 
without a reference to commercial or arm’s-length, then this transaction is scored as 1. 
• With regards to TPRICE item 5, review the section on governance to see if a formal transfer pricing policy or 
methodology is described. Then review related party transaction notes to see if a particular transfer pricing 
method is described. Non-existence of a formal policy regarding related party or intra-company transfers of 
assets, services and funds is scored as 1, otherwise 0. Some firms describe the existence of a formal transfer 
pricing arrangement established with the ATO, so this is scored as 0. 
• With regards to TPRICE item 6, review the notes on asset sale and purchases and related party transactions. If 
assets are sold among group members with no description that the transaction was undertaken on normal 
commercial terms, this is scored as 1; otherwise 0. 
• With regards to TPRICE item 7, review the notes on related party transactions. If transactions are not described 
as being on normal commercial terms such as a loan between group members, this is scored as 1; otherwise 0. 
• With regards to TPRICE item 8, review the notes on related party transactions and tax losses. If there have 
been losses (accounting or tax) transferred among group members, this is scored as 1; otherwise 0. 
• Evidence to support a score of 1 can be obtained from both narrative and/or accounting data. For example, a 
single line item ‘Intercompany debt forgiveness’ in the financial statements could be used as evidence to 
support scoring TPRICE item 2. 
• If an item is deemed not-applicable (e.g. no material intragroup loans), reduce the number of items comprising 
TPRICE accordingly. 
  





Descriptive statistics – TPRICE index items for sample firms. 
Variable Description Mean 
ITEM1 The existence of interest free loans between related entities. 0.469 
ITEM2 The existence of debt forgiveness between related entities. 0.103 
ITEM3 The existence of impaired loans between related entities. 0.142 
ITEM4 The provision of non-monetary consideration (e.g. services or non-liquid assets) 
without commercial justification between related entities. 
0.103 
ITEM5 The absence of formal documentation held by the firm to support the selection and 
application of the most appropriate arm’s length methodologies or the absence of 
formal documentation relating to transfer pricing between related entities. 
0.901 
ITEM6 The disposal of capital assets to related entities without commercial justification. 0.032 
ITEM7 The absence of arm’s length justification for transactions between related entities. 0.300 
ITEM8 The transfer of losses between related entities without commercial justification. 0.060 
N = 183 for all variables. 
 
  






Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
TPRICE 0.262 0.146 0 0.250 0.750 
SIZE 20.704 1.683 16.997 20.526 25.260 
PROFIT 1.910 14.069 0 3.570 25.156 
LEV 0.622 0.207 0 0.673 1.254 
INTANG 1.745 5.041 0 0 18.021 
MULTI 0.367 0.290 0.100 0.302 1 
THAV 0.390 0.489 0 0 1 
Variable definitions: TPRICE = the transfer pricing aggressiveness index ranging 0–100 percent; 
SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; PROFIT = the natural logarithm of pre-tax income; 
LEV = long-term debt divided by total assets; INTANG = the natural logarithm of R&D 
expenditure; MULTI = the total number of foreign subsidiaries divided by the total number of 
subsidiaries; and THAV = a dummy variable, coded 1 if the firm has at least one subsidiary 
company incorporated in an OECD (2006) listed tax haven, otherwise 0.  








Descriptive statistics of TPRICE index by industry. 
Industry N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
CAPG 18 0.153 0.117 0 0.125 0.375 
COSR 29 0.276 0.151 0.125 0.250 0.625 
ENE 38 0.273 0.169 0.125 0.250 0.750 
FSB 6 0.375 0.137 0.250 0.375 0.625 
MAT 52 0.278 0.130 0 0.250 0.625 
MEDI 8 0.203 0.647 0.125 0.250 0.250 
PHAH 11 0.250 0.137 0 0.250 0.500 
REAL 9 0.305 0.141 0.125 0.375 0.500 
TRAN 3 0.333 0.191 0.125 0.375 0.500 
UTIL 9 0.222 0.136 0 0.250 0.500 
Variable definitions: CAPG = capital goods industry dummy; COSR = consumer service retail industry dummy; 
ENE = energy industry dummy; FSB = food, staples and beverage industry dummy; MEDI = media industry 
dummy; PHAH = pharmaceuticals and healthcare industry dummy; REAL = real estate industry dummy; TRAN = 
transport industry dummy; and UTIL = utilities industry dummy.  
The industry classification is based on two-digit GICS codes.  





 TPRICE SIZE PROFIT LEV INTANG MULTI THAV 
TPRICE – 0.302*** 0.233*** 0.238*** 0.149** 0.146** 0.116* 
SIZE 0.302*** – 0.165** 0.308*** 0.092 0.092 0.316*** 
PROFIT 0.233*** 0.164** – 0.185** 0.067 0.001 0.103 
LEV 0.236*** 0.295*** 0.183** – –0.010 0.048 0.217*** 
INTANG 0.103* 0.083 0.034 –0.012 – 0.199*** 0.088 
MULTI 0.145** 0.091 0.001 0.046 0.199*** – 0.297*** 
THAV 0.116* 0.316*** 0.103 0.217*** 0.088 0.298*** – 
Variable definitions: TPRICE = the transfer pricing aggressiveness index ranging 0–100 percent; SIZE = the natural logarithm 
of total assets; PROFIT = the natural logarithm of pre-tax income; LEV = long-term debt divided by total assets; INTANG = the 
natural logarithm of R&D expenditure; MULTI = the total number of foreign subsidiaries divided by the total number of 
subsidiaries; and THAV = a dummy variable, coded 1 if the firm has at least one subsidiary company incorporated in an OECD 
(2006) listed tax haven, otherwise 0. 
N = 183 for all variables.  
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients (Spearman rank correlation coefficients) are reported below (above) the 
diagonal. The p–values are one-tailed for directional hypotheses and two-tailed otherwise. 
*Significance at the 0.10 level.  
**Significance at the 0.05 level.  










Base regression model results. 
 Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient 
(Standardized) 
Std. Error t-value 
Intercept ? 1.912 1.642 4.82*** 
SIZE + 0.262 0.879 2.59*** 
PROFIT + 0.135 0.077 1.83** 
LEV + 0.123 0.792 2.33** 
INTANG + 0.061 0.214 1.82** 
MULTI + 0.032 0.152 2.28** 
THAV + 0.021 0.540 0.25 
INDSEC:     
CAPG ? 0.202 0.456 2.32** 
COSR ? 0.176 0.450 2.10** 
ENE ? 0.178 0.959 2.05** 
FSB ? 0.211 0.604 2.60*** 
MEDI ? 0.214 0.291 2.91*** 
PHAH ? 0.153 0.664 2.27** 
REAL ? 0.015 0.514 0.20 
TRAN ? 0.003 0.285 0.05 
UTIL ? 0.010 0.969 1.32 
     
Adj. R2 (percent) 13.51%    
F-value 4.00    
(Two-tailed p–value) (0.01)    
N 183    
Variable definitions: SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; PROFIT = the natural logarithm of pre-tax 
income; LEV = long-term debt divided by total assets; INTANG = the natural logarithm of R&D expenditure; 
MULTI = the total number of foreign subsidiaries divided by the total number of subsidiaries; THAV = a dummy 
variable, coded 1 if the firm has at least one subsidiary company incorporated in an OECD (2006) listed tax haven, 
otherwise 0; and INDSEC = industry sector dummy variables that take a value of 1 if the firm is represented in the 
specific GICS category, otherwise 0. Thus: CAPG = capital goods dummy; COSR = consumer service retail 
dummy; ENE = energy dummy; FSB = food, staples and beverage dummy; MEDI = media dummy; PHAH = 
pharmaceuticals and healthcare dummy; REAL = real estate dummy; TRAN = transport dummy; and UTIL = 
utilities dummy. 
Standard errors are corrected using the White (1980) procedure. The p–values are one-tailed for directional 
hypotheses and two-tailed otherwise. 
*Significance at the 0.10 level.  
**Significance at the 0.05 level.  






















Extended regression model results – interaction effects. 
  Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient 
(Standardized) 
Std. Error t-value 
Intercept ? 1.903 1.650 4.79*** 
SIZE + 0.263 0.883 2.58*** 
PROFIT + 0.135 0.077 1.82** 
LEV + 0.119 0.665 2.37** 
INTANG + 0.070 0.278 1.79** 
MULTI + 0.034 0.142 2.21** 
THAV + 0.026 0.629 0.30 
MULTI *INTANG + 0.072 0.769 2.01** 
THAV*INTANG + 0.056 0.680 0.51 
INDSEC:     
CAPG ? 0.212 0.560 2.21** 
COSR ? 0.175 0.479 2.12** 
ENE ? 0.180 0.977 2.07** 
FSB ? 0.208 0.661 2.64*** 
MEDI ? 0.218 0.318 2.83*** 
PHAH ? 0.154 0.699 2.25** 
REAL ? 0.015 0.518 0.20 
TRAN ? 0.002 0.329 0.03 
UTIL ? 0.010 0.906 1.33 
     
Adj. R2 (percent) 13.65    
F-value 4.03    
(Two-tailed p–value) (0.01)    
N 183    
Variable definitions: SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; PROFIT = the natural logarithm of pre-tax 
income; LEV = long-term debt divided by total assets; INTANG = the natural logarithm of R&D expenditure; 
MULTI = the total number of foreign subsidiaries divided by the total number of subsidiaries; THAV = a dummy 
variable, coded 1 if the firm has at least one subsidiary company incorporated in an OECD (2006) listed tax haven, 
otherwise 0; MULTI*INTANG = an interaction term computed by multiplying MULTI by INTANG; and 
THAV*INTANG = an interaction term computed by multiplying THAV by INTANG; and INDSEC = industry sector 
dummy variables that take a value of 1 if the firm is represented in the specific GICS category, otherwise 0. Thus: 
CAPG = capital goods dummy; COSR = consumer service retail dummy; ENE = energy dummy; FSB = food, 
staples and beverage dummy; MEDI = media dummy; PHAH = pharmaceuticals and healthcare dummy; REAL = 
real estate dummy; TRAN = transport dummy; and UTIL = utilities dummy. 
Standard errors are corrected using the White (1980) procedure. The p–values are one-tailed for directional 
hypotheses and two-tailed otherwise. 
*Significance at the 0.10 level.  
**Significance at the 0.05 level.  
***Significance at the 0.01 level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
